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This article revisits a puzzle: why did the Conservative Governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major not grant
independence to the Bank of England? A substantial literature offers several explanations for why New Labour carried out this
reform to UK monetary policy, many of which ought to have been relevant to the Conservatives’ stewardship of the economy in
the 1980s and 1990s. So why did the Conservatives fail to see the advantages of a policy that the Blair Government seized on as
one of its first acts of office? Combining new archival research with elite interviews of some key participants during this period,
this article re-examines this neglected question. It argues that one overlooked reason why the Conservatives decided against
granting independence to the Bank of England relates to the role and importance of inter-organisational distrust. Conservative
leaders (and Treasury officials) had negative expectations about the Bank’s ability to implement monetary policy and did not







There is now a significant literature on the economic policies of the Thatcher and Major administrations (e.g. Keegan 1984, 1989,
Smith 1987, 1992, Johnson 1991, Thompson 2014). However, to our knowledge, no detailed study exists that exclusively examines
this questionwhy they failed to grant independence to the Bank of England (BoE). Instead, academic consideration of
Conservative attitudes towards central bank independence (CBI) tends to be absorbed into broader tracts on British political
economy. Likewise, while there is extensive scholarship describing why New Labour granted independence to the BoE, discussion
of why the Conservatives failed to implement such reform is usually subsumed within a broader investigation of the Blair
Government. This literature provides a range of explanations for why elected politicians devolve responsibility for monetary
policy on to non-elected central bankers. Some point to the power of economic ideas and their sponsors; some highlight
electoral considerations; others emphasise broader constitutional factors. But what is striking is that many of these factors ought
in theory to have applied to the Thatcher and Major Governments in the 1980s and the 1990s. So what stopped the Conservatives
from granting operational independence to the BoE?
This article makes both an empirical and a theoretical contribution to scholarship on this subject. Combining new archival
research with interviews from key participants, it uncovers the reasons behind what we claim to be the ambiguous behaviour of
the Thatcher and Major Governments towards the issue of BoE independence. Theoretically, the article highlights the importance
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of inter-organisational distrust as an important part of the explanation for the decision not to introduce CBI. In particular, both
Thatcher and Major (often with tacit support from Treasury officials) rejected the idea of CBI because they had negative
expectations about the Bank’s ability to implement monetary policy in a way commensurate with their broader objectives. The
next section of the article reviews the existing literature on this topic and establishes the intellectual puzzle. We then examine the
concept of inter-organisational trust/distrust and set out the theoretical approach underpinning our research. The second half of
the article presents our empirical findings.
Many accounts of why governments grant independence to central banks begin with what might be termed an ‘economist-
centred’ approach (Hall 1989). Politicians have come to accept the idea of CBI because of the gradual influence it has attained
within the economics profession. Many economists have argued that central banks should have more autonomy over monetary
policy because they view it as a more effective strategy for promoting low and stable inflation. Politicians are believed to be
poor at delivering this outcome because of the so-called ‘time-inconsistency’ problem. While they constantly seek to reassure the
markets and the public that they are committed to the control of prices, when an election approaches they will frequently be
tempted to renege on this commitment, stimulate the economy and deliberately stoke an inflationary boom just before the polls.
A more optimal solution to the problem of how to control inflation it to place responsibility for monetary policy in the hands of
central bankers who will be insulated from such political pressure (e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano 1988, Gilardi 2007). While most
academics accept that there is something to this explanation, there is a consensus in the literature that the spread of CBI reflects
something more than the promotion of the idea by economists (Goodman 1991, McNamara 2002). CBI has become popular for
parties in government because it allows them to realise other interests.
Arguably, the most extensive discussion of why the Conservatives found the idea of CBI unattractive makes precisely this
argument. Michael King (2005) claims that the Thatcher and Major Governments failed to grant independence to the BoE because
the idea conflicted with their objective of winning elections. This was despite the fact that CBI had powerful political sponsors in
the form of two Chancellors of the Exchequer: Nigel Lawson and Norman Lamont. Moreover, CBI was discussed during periods of
genuine uncertainty for economic management. Lawson proposed such a reform in 1988 at a time when both the notion of
monetary targeting been abandoned and inflation was rising at a worrying rate (Oliver 1997, pp. 108–33). In 1992, Lamont revived
the idea in the wake of sterling’s ejection from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) – the Major Government’s
preferred instrument for controlling inflation at the time. Ultimately the key reason why CBI was not pursued was opposition from
Number Ten. Neither Thatcher nor Major was attracted to the scheme because they wanted to maintain control over monetary
policyit clashed with their political objectives. In particular, they were both worried about the economic and political impact of
high interest rates on property-owning Conservative voters (King 2005, pp. 101–5).
While King’s emphasis on the role of electoral considerations appears persuasive, a closer appreciation of the Conservatives
wider economic strategy shows that electoral considerations can provide only part of the explanation for its behaviour. In
particular, King does not account for the fact that, in the early 1990s, the Conservatives did implement a policy which, in effect,
resulted in the government losing control over interest rates with disastrous political consequences. In agreeing to join the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), Whitehall accepted that interest rates would primarily be used to align sterling as
close as possible to the parity of DM 2:95: a level that officials believed was consistent with low and stable inflation in the UK. As
has been widely documented, this strategy did not produce the intended effects. To stop sterling falling out of the ERM, the
government was forced to raise interest rates to fifteen per cent in the middle of a recession, leading to bankruptcies and
negative equity for many households (Thompson 1996). In short, King’s argument provides an answer to our puzzle but also raises
a question: why did the Conservatives accede to ERM membership as a method for controlling inflation but not BoE
independence? Constraints of space preclude a full empirical investigation of Conservative attitudes towards ERM membership,
but below, we show how the importance of trust (or the lack of it) can also shed light on this conundrum.
Another influential explanation of CBI is the depoliticisation interpretation (Burnham 2001). Burnham (2001, pp. 128–9) defines
depoliticisation as the practice whereby public officials place the political character of decision-making at one remove. New
Labour’s decision to grant operational independence to the BoE in the area of monetary policy is often viewed as a ‘classic’
example of depoliticisation because Labour politicians devolved responsibility for interest rate decisions to a neutral, non-
partisan body at arms-length from government. For Burnham, depoliticisation does not denote the genuine devolution of power.
Elites retain control over outcomes ‘at a distance’: for example, by having the power to define the mandate of the central bank, or
changing the interest rate target. Burnham claims that politicians are motivated by the belief that the improved market
expectations concerning the credibility of economic policy that result from this ploy will have electoral benefits. However, if a
central bank turns out to be little better at controlling inflation, then this depoliticisation strategy will allow elected
representatives to shift blame away from themselves (thus avoiding the resultant political opprobrium). Although some scholars
(Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2013) have questioned the usefulness of depoliticisation (especially the idea of blame-shifting) when it
comes to accounting for New Labour’s decision to grant independence to the Bank of England, evidence does exist which
The Conservatives and Bank of England Independence: Existing Literature
supports the broad thrust of the thesis (e.g. Keegan 2004, p. 157, 164). The more pressing puzzle is why the Conservatives did not
identifyappreciate the appealadvantages of this move before 1997, or if they did, why they did not act on themit (see also
Burnham 2017)?
Dellepiane-Avellaneda (2013) also highlights the political advantagesbenefits that accompany the idea of CBI but employs
William Riker’s concept of heresthetics to develop his argument. Heresthetics refers to the art of political manipulation: ‘It is
about “structuring the world so that you can win”’ (Riker quoted in Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2013, p. 271). Political actors create,
reform and then reproduce institutions so as to ensure the rules of the game are configured in their favour. For Dellepiane-
Avellaneda, the Blair Government’s decision to confer independence should be viewed in such a way. Chancellor Brown placed
the implementation of monetary policy at one remove as a method of binding other groups into New Labour’s economic
strategy. His intention was to enable the leadership to deflect any calls from backbenchers, business and trade unions for lower
interest rates and higher public spending – actions which could endanger the Blair Government’s anti-inflation credentials. Again,
while Dellepiane-Avellaneda’s account of BoE independence is convincing, the question remains: why were the Conservatives not
motivated to act in the same way? The concept of heresthetics has been used by Iain McLean (2001, p. 206) to make sense of
Conservative policies in the 1980s. While he argues that Thatcher was a ‘hesitant heresthetician’, whose attempts at political
manipulation were not always successful, in the field of economic policy, Thatcher’s ability to redefine the political agenda and,
more particularly, to limit the number of issues that the public believed government should be held responsible for (through her
advocacy of free markets) was a key reason why Conservatives dominated the political scene in the 1980s.
Another strand of the literature that might help resolve this puzzle draws attention to the broader constitutional make-up of a
country. Specifically, it is argued that independent central banks are more likely to exist in countries with a federal form of
government. CBI is favoured in federal political systems because of the perceived need to insulate economic policy from veto
players advancing claims for special treatment, often in the form of greater public expenditure. The broader political culture of
federal systems is also opposed to the concentration of public power, especially in the hands of elected representatives because
it is feared that they will use such a position to further their own interests rather than the welfare of the country as a whole
(Banaian et al. 1986, Hallerberg 2003). Given its political tradition of centralised government and lack of institutional pluralism
(certainly before 1997) Britain was unlikely to be amenable to the idea of CBI. If anything, the Conservatives presided over a
further centralisation of power within Whitehall in the 1980s and 1990s (Holliday 2000, Moran 2003).
The centralised nature of the British political system provides a plausible answer to the question of why the Conservatives failed
to perceive the attractions of CBI (Thatcher 1993, p. 706). However, it is dangerous to simply ‘read-off’ decisions from macro-level
institutions. What may matter just as much are the beliefs that political actors have about these institutions, as well as other
groups operating within them. Despite the hierarchical structure of British government, Conservative leaders throughout this
period were consistently concerned about the threat of veto players to their economic strategy, most notably the trade unions. It
was at this time that Thatcher and her supporters internalised a more general New Right critique of interest groups as self-
interested lobbies capable of subverting the pursuit of low and stable inflation.  However, if ministers thought about their
political position in this way, why did they not grant independence to the BoE as a method for insulating themselves from this
domestic pressure? The rest of this article argues that a full answer to this puzzle lies beyond constitutional factors, electoral
calculations or economic ideas. The role of trust, especially between organisations, also needs to be considered.
This article adopts an analytical narrative to explore this intellectual puzzle (Bates et al. 1998). Analytical narratives combine
theoretical and methodological considerations found in the social sciences with the narrative form often utilised in historical
studies. Analytical narratives are ‘organising perspectives’ or theoretical lenses that provide different ways of looking at the world.
These narratives accept that theory should be grounded in factual detail, but also recognise that the ‘facts don’t speak for
themselves’. All empirical analysis requires choices concerning what to include and what to leave out. These choices will, in turn,
reflect more fundamental ontological assumptions about the world, some of which may not be subject to empirical refutation.
Analytical narratives cannot in themselves be falsified, but produce more specific arguments and expectations that can be. One of
their key contributions is to shine a light on neglected questions and provide new insights that may then help to stimulate new
lines of research (Dowding 2016, pp. 72–9).
There is now a significant body of literature demonstrating the importance of trust for understanding individual and collective
behaviour. That said, trust is not a straightforward concept to use in empirical research. It is employed in several academic
disciplines, and is subject to a range of definitions, all of which have their own particular analytical focus (Hosmer 1995, Bottery
2003). For example, psychologists often conceptualise trust as a personal trait that individuals possess in varying degrees (for
example, Hochreich and Rotter 1970). For economists, trust can involve a relationship and is something that reduces transaction
costs between individuals or firms in the exchange of goods and services (Hill 1990). Sociologists often conceive of trust as a
social reality: a property that permeates social systems (Davis Lewis and Weigert 1985). These different meanings are not
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mutually exclusive. As we shall see from the discussion below, trust is not something associated solely with agency or structure.
However, the contested nature of the term makes the employment of trust (and distrust) more complicated.
Despite its contested nature, there is some common ground between these contrasting conceptions of trust. Oomsels and
Bouckaert (2014) have provided a comprehensive survey of different definitions in the literature to show that a number of key
attributes can be found in many usages of the term. These findings lead them to define trust as: ‘  …  the intentional and
behavioural suspension of vulnerability by a trustor on the basis of positive expectations of a trustee’ (p. 582). Understood in this
way, trust is a voluntary act associated with agency. It stems from the understandings that individuals, groups or organisations
have about each other, although as we shall see, these beliefs will be shaped by the broader institutional environment within
which the trust relationship exists (Grey and Garsten 2001, p. 233). The phrase ‘positive expectations’ relates to various qualities in
the literature, but for the purposes of this article, the most relevant referent is the perceived skills or competencies of the trustee
to make decisions in a way that is commensurate with the interests and beliefs of the trustor (Rommel and Christiaens 2009, p.
84). Based on these positive expectations, the ‘suspension of vulnerability’ denotes a willingness by the trustor to discount any
uncertainty or ambiguity in the relationship and increase their dependence on the trustee to deliver certain outcomes (Van de
Walle and Six 2014, p. 161).
Oomsels and Bouckaert (2014) move from this discussion to conceptualise inter-organisational trust as: ‘the extent of trust placed
in the partner organisation by members of the focal organisation …  ’ (p. 590) where trust is understood as the suspension of
vulnerability on the basis of positive expectations. When operationalising inter-organisational trust, it is important not to commit
the fallacy of reification. As noted already, trust relations flow through agency and inter-organisational trust can be said to exist
when individuals mandated to act on an organisation’s behalf cooperate with similarly mandated individuals in other
organisations. Any such relationships of trust will not be based solely on personal attributes: those mandated to act for
organisations will also engage with others on the basis of an outlook that will be shaped by the rules, routines and culture of their
respective workplaces (Sztompka 1998). Inter-organisational trust is widely viewed as a positive thing. It shouldis thought to result
in greater collaboration, a sharing of information and opinion, which ultimately leads to an increase in the effectiveness of
decision-making (Choudhury 2008).
Conversely, distrust is defined by Oomsels and Bouckaert (2014, p. 588) as ‘ …  the intentional and behavioural rejection of
vulnerability by a trustor on the basis of negative expectations of the trustee’. If trust is associated with cooperation and
engagement, distrust signifies atomised behaviour. Organisations that do not trust each other will resist attempts to exert
influence over their own activities. Efforts will be made to conceal or distort data and opinion, especially if such information is
perceived to heighten the organisation’s vulnerability. Ultimately an organisation may seek to withdraw contact from those it
does not trust or, if that is not practical, will devise strategies to minimise the adverse impact of any dependency relationships. If
trust is widely believed to have a beneficial impact on decision-making, it is often suggested that distrust diminishes the efficacy
of joint problem-solving.
While inter-organisational trust/distrust comprises the study of relationships, it is important to note that these connections may
be differentiated and complex. Even if we were concerned with analysing a simple association between two people (A and B) it is
unlikely that A will trust B across all of the activities that they engage in together. What is true for individuals is more likely to be
the case for inter-organisational relations. Organisation A will trust organisation B on some issues, but not others. To complicate
matters, organisations are often divided: at any one moment, some individuals within an organisation will have a disposition to
trust, whilst others (based on negative expectations) will caution against increasing their vulnerability and dependence. Trust and
distrust perceptions may exist simultaneously between organisations, leading to a diverse range of connections over a number of
matters (Lewicki et al. 1998, p. 441). As we shall see, these assertions have relevance to our empirical discussion. Both the
Conservative leadership and the Treasury were divided over the merits of trusting the BoE with greater operational independence
over monetary policy.
Moreover, trust (or the lack of it) will be affected by the way organisational relations play out over time. It is often argued that
repeated encounters will enhance the knowledge the trustor (government) has of the trustee (BoE), which will, in turn, reduce
uncertainty between the two and increase their propensity to trust each other (Choudhury 2008). More contact will bolster trust in
a positive way; less contact will have the opposite effect. However, just as relevant may be the starting point of any relationship,
as demonstrated in the work of Zand (1972). If two organisations (A and B) start off by distrusting each other, further contact may
only strengthen suspicion and wariness. Organisation A, acting on the basis of negative expectations towards organisation B will
refuse to share relevant and important information, while simultaneously trying to control its behaviour. Such actions will
reinforce organisation B’s own scepticism about organisation A, leading to an ‘ … equilibrium level of low trust’ (ibid., p. 33). Zand
developed what he termed the Spiral Reinforcement Model to account for such behaviour.
Finally, if we are to investigate the role of inter-organisational distrust as a factor underpinning the Conservative’s reluctance to
embrace CBI, it is important we place our discussion of these organisational relations within a broader institutional context
(Luhmann 1979, Barber 1983). Like individuals, organisations do not exist independently of the system to which they belong. It
may be possible to appreciate whether this institutional environment facilitates or constrains the potentialities for trust between
the organisations under study. Some institutional settings may encourage the development of positive expectations, allowing
organisations to suspend vulnerability and trust each other. Other structures may complicate or undermine the chances that
organisations will co-operate and increase their dependency on each other. Moreover, institutional contexts are not static: they
may change over time in ways that either helps or hinders the prospects for inter-organisational trust (see also Bachmann and
Inkpen 2011).
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed account of the institutional context underpinning relations between
successive Conservative Governments and the BoE in the 1980s and 1990s. However, two features of this structure are relevant to
the argument below. First, in the post-war period, relations between Whitehall and the BoE were often characterised by
separation, sometimes fuelling mutual suspicion. Monetary policy was the main preserve of the BoE, while fiscal policy was the
sole responsibility of the government. The nationalisation of the BoE (1946) had little impact on the practice of monetary policy
and did little to bring the Treasury and the Bank together. When drafting the legislation, the Attlee Government failed to
challenge Threadneedle Street’s culture of secrecy, nor did ministers attempt to increase its accountability (Fay 1987, p. 30,
Kynaston 2002, pp. 9–13). Occasional efforts by the Treasury in the 1950s and 1960s to lobby for ceilings on bank credit as a
method of checking inflation were met by a hostile reaction from the BoE, which viewed such efforts as an unwanted intrusion
into its own domain (Cairncross 1989, p. 21, 37–8, 41, 43, Kynaston 2002, pp. 25–7, 43–5, 67–76, 248–51).
A second feature of this institutional context was the gradual politicisation of monetary policy, as inflation replaced
unemployment as the number one priority preoccupying governments in the 1970s (Burnham 2007). Ministers attempted to
influence and direct interest rate policy, a development most graphically illustrated by Edward Heath’s refusal to raise the Bank
rate after economic growth took off in 1972 (Capie 2010, pp. 508–23). A similar tendency can be witnessed in the area of
exchange rate policy, where it has been argued that the 1976 Sterling Crisis was precipitated by the Treasury’s attempt to covertly
devalue the pound (Fay 1987, p. 73, Healey 1989, p. 427). [Q2]  Finally, successive governments increasingly interfered in the BoE’s
management of the gilt market because of the interest that ministers had begun to take in the monetary target Domestic Credit
Expansion and its relationship to inflation. In particular, Dennis Healey and Jim Callaghan were both critical of the Bank’s failure
to smooth out the sale of government securities: a shortcoming that was thought to contribute to the short-term growth of the
money supply (Capie 2010, p. 667, 691–2). This criticism was shared by monetarists like Brian Griffiths, who had become
Thatcher’s economic adviser in opposition (Griffiths 1976). It short, it might be suggested that these two institutional features
(separation; politicisation) did not provide a backdrop that was conducive to positive discussions onf CBI.
Although other academics have tried to understand why the Conservatives failed to grant independence to the Bank of England,
to our knowledge, this is the first investigation which focuses on providing an answer to this question based on an extensive
search of the archives. For the pre-1990 period, we were able to consult relevant archival documents in the Bank of England
Archive; the Treasury papers at the National Archives; and the Howe papers at the Bodleian Library. These archives were
particularly useful for the discussion of CBI in the second half of the 1970s. For the 1980s and the 1990s, we supplemented gaps in
our knowledge with a range of other sources, in particular elite interviews with five key participants from both the Thatcher and
Major Governments and the BoE. We draw upon four of these interviews in this article, and additional written answers obtained
from another key participant at the BoE in the 1990s. Furthermore, this interview material was cross checked against information
from memoirs, government papers, parliamentary papers, speeches, party publications and other secondary sources. We focused
on those books and articles that were either published by figures who had been close to events at the time (e.g. journalists), or
scholars who have also based their accounts on extensive primary research.
To summarise, the Conservative’s failure to grant independence to the BoE presents us with an intellectual puzzle. Many of the
explanations put forward in the literature for why CBI occurs ought to have applied to the Thatcher and Major governments, so
why did the party in office in the 1980s and 1990s fail to see the advantages of such an idea? While we accept that electoral
considerations go some the way to understandinganswering this question its behaviour, it will be argued below that inter-
organisational distrust between Conservative leaders (supported by Treasury officials) and the BoE meant the idea of CBI did not
gain traction in the 1980s and the 1990s. Following on from the discussion in Oomsels and Bouckaert, this distrust manifested
itself in three ways: (i) the perception that CBI represented a loss of ministerial control over monetary policy; (ii) policy differences
between Thatcherite Conservatives and the Bank over monetarist ideas, and; (iii) negative expectations about the BoE’s
competence to implement monetary policy in a way that was consistent with the Party’s political objectives.
When Conservative attitudes towards CBI are examined in the existing literature, accounts usually begin in 1988 when Nigel
Lawson (then Chancellor of the Exchequer) unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Margaret Thatcher about the merits of the idea.
However, the Conservatives had arguably a more extensive discussion about BoE independence in opposition in the 1970s. The
leadership was serious enough to mention such a proposal in its policy document The Right Approach to the Economy (Howe et al.
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1977), which assertedargued that Britain could learn useful lessons from other countries. David Howell, one of its principal
authors, confirms these aspirations. He argues that the proposals for CBI were a conscious attempt to learn from the example of
the Bundesbank, a stance that reflected a broader sympathy for German political economy within the Conservative party
leadership at this time (Joseph 1976). To quote Howell (1986, p. 149) directly:
There was a strong sympathy for the idea that monetary policy … was too important and complex to be
left in the centre of the political arena, and that we could do worse than follow the German
example of placing monetary judgments in more independent hands. In other words, if the Bank of
England could be given the independence from the politicians  …  the management of monetary policy
could be taken out of the front line, over-selling of monetarism avoided, and government policy
generally presented in a less abstract and desiccated form.
In December 1977, the Bow Group (a prominent Conservative think tank) released a report with three more specific suggestions
for CBI: (i) changing the ‘main duty of the’ Bank of England so it would be ‘similar to that of the Bundesbank in Germany – with a
duty of “safeguarding the currency”’; (ii) repealing the Treasury’s authority to direct the Bank and ; (iii) parliamentary approval for
money supply targets ‘agreed by the Treasury and Tthe Bank of England’, with any variation requiring parliamentary consent (Bow
Group 1977). However, by 1979, the idea had been dropped and did not make it into the manifesto of that year.
This rejection, in part, reflected the presence of inter-organisational distrust: a refusal by the Conservatives to increase their
vulnerability in the area of monetary policy because of negative expectations of the BoE’s competence to fulfil this function.
First, CBI was perceived to involve a loss of ministerial and bureaucratic control – at a time where, as noted, Whitehall had begun to
increasingly interfere in the conduct of monetary policy. We have already highlighted Howell’s hope that BoE independence
might help to reduce the influence of politicians on policy. At an October 1977 meeting between leading Conservatives and Bank
officials, the Bank asked what would happen under independence if its views diverged with those of the Treasury. The minutes
record that ‘Sir Geoffrey Howe and Sir Keith Joseph indicated that we see the Bank as the conscience of monetary policy’, adding
that ‘we welcome the idea of a degree of restraint on the Government’s current power and degree of freedom’ (Conservative
Research Department 1977). However, in a letter written to Nigel Lawson (a spokesman in the Shadow Treasury Team) two
months later, Howe himself expressed doubts about the wisdom of CBI. While supporting two of the Bow Group’s proposals
(noted above), Howe was ‘much less certain’ about a total repeal of the Treasury’s authority to instruct the Bank as it ‘would be
more explosive than might be justified’ (Howe 1977).
If the Conservatives shied away from CBI because they were concerned about losing control over monetary policy, there was no
pressure from the Bank itself for a move in this direction. Without doubt, the BoE under Leslie O’Brien (Governor of the Bank of
England, 1966 [Q3]– 73) and Gordon Richardson (1973–83) was keen to have more influence over economic management. Fay
(19867 [Q4], pp. 114–15) argues that independence would have been ‘ … a remarkably enticing prospect … ’ for the Bank, adding
that it ‘ … was freedom the Bank had always envied in the German and American central banks’. After the 1979 election victory, a
Treasury memo felt the need to warn the incoming Conservative team that given the inclusion of the idea in The Right Approach
to the Economy, the BoE, ‘may well take the first possible opportunity to raise with the Chancellor the question of the
independence of the Bank of England’. Indeed, the memo went as far as to set out counter-arguments for the Conservatives to
use, expressing doubts about the feasibility of the Bank managing a self-contained monetary targeting regime separate from
fiscal policy and ministerial decisions about wider economic trade-offs (Bridgeman 1979). In a belated reply, Douglas Wass,
Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, noted that ‘I have not had to draw upon’ the counter-arguments because ‘The danger which
we feared has not in fact materialised’ (Wass 1979). Terry Burns, who joined the Treasury as Chief Economic Adviser in 1980,
commented that during this period he could ‘recall no discussion about Bank of England independence at all’ (Burns personal
interview 2016). Although this correspondence does not explain the Bank’s lack of support for CBI, a clue might be found in the
experience of David Howell. After the publication of The Right Approach to the Economy, he went to see friends at Threadneedle
Street to ask them what they thought of the idea of independence. He was told that it ‘would never happen’ for the simple
reasons that politicians do not like to give away control over monetary policy (Fay 1986, p. 115, Hacche and Taylor 2013, p. 184).
Second, concerns about a loss of control were compounded by genuine differences between Thatcherite Conservatives and the BoE
over the doctrine of monetarism. During the 1970s the Bank gradually endorsed the basic monetarist proposition that growth in
the money supply was linked to inflation, however, Richardson was careful to hedge this argument with various qualifications.
Rising prices were not the result of one factor, but instead reflected a multitude of determinants (including rising incomes).
Where money was important, the causal line to inflation could plausibly run the other way: rising prices could actually lead to an
increase in the money supply not vice versa (Lawson 1978, Richardson 1978, Ridley 1978). When monetarismit was introduced
after 1979, the BoE became increasingly unhappy about the it s practice. of monetarism. It criticised the introduction of the
Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS), viewing it as a ‘politicisation’ of monetary policy (Howe 1994, p. 163, Kynaston 1995,
Goodhart, 2014). In this context, it is worth remembering that Conservative politicians (especially Lawson) were the principal
authors of the MTFS (the Bank wasn’t consulted), including the M3 growth targets that were believed to be consistent with low
and stable inflation. It is also important to stress the prominent role that fiscal policy played in the framework: there were targets
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for reducing the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) which was thought to be connected to M3 because government
spending was a key component of this measurement of the money supply. Of course, this interpretation of monetarism granted
further power to ministers who remained responsible for fiscal measures. The fact that the MTFS contained no exchange rate
target was also a source of tension between the Thatcher Government and the Bank. The latter became increasingly concerned
about the impact of sterling’s appreciation on the fortunes of British industry (Browning 1986, pp. 149–50, Middlemas 1991,
pp. 244–6, Hacche and Taylor 2013, pp. 193, 144, 154–6, 160, 176–8).
Finally, Conservative leaders had negative expectations about the BoE’s competence to implement monetary policy at this time. We
have already noted the reservations of monetarists like Griffiths over the Bank’s management of the gilt market. Moreover,
Williamson (2015, pp. 214–5) has suggested that the failure of the Competition and Credit Control Act (1971) during the Heath
government may have contributed to the Party’s scepticism towards Threadneedle Street. The Act (which reflected the ideas of
John Fforde in the BoE) saw the BoE abolish a range of physical controls on the availability of credit to be replaced by a system
whereby access to credit would be determined solely by price (i.e. level of interest). The outcome was that the BoE failed to
control both the volume and the direction of lending, which in turn, contributed to a surge in inflation and a secondary banking
crisis that required several financial institutions to be rescued from insolvency. The BoE’s style of supervision was widely blamed;
indeed some commentators accused it of no longer understanding the money markets. Its preference for monitoring the banking
system via informal and personal contacts through the Discount Office was viewed as inadequate and out of date. While Heath’s
refusal to sanction interest rate raisesrises until it was too late also undermined the whole operation of CCC, the episode
undoubtedly damaged the Bank’s reputation for competence, something that Richardson was aware of (Kynaston 2002, p. 451).
By 1988 the MTFS had been discarded and Lawson had placed BoE independence back on the agenda. According to his
memoirs, the Bank was to be given sole responsibility for the operation of monetary policy, with a statutory duty to maintain the
value of sterling. In light of this new obligation, the Bank would set short-term interest rates and monetary targets. While the
Government would determine the exchange rate framework, the Bank would be given the power to implement currency policy
within these parameters. It would be granted a portion of reserves for the purpose of intervening in the markets, but the Treasury
would set the limits on total intervention. Lawson accepted the Bank would ‘probably’ have to be made politically accountable,
although not, ‘ … in a way which … [subjected] … the Bank to unwanted Parliamentary pressure’ (Lawson 1992, p. 1061). Thatcher’s
rejection of this proposal reflected the continued importance of inter-organisational distrust. She still saw CBI as involving a loss
of control over monetary policy to an institution whose competence in this area she doubted. In these views she was again
backed by Treasury officials, despite Lawson’s support for BoE independence. Indeed, the Treasury viewed the government’s
record in this area (particularly the reduction of inflation) in positive terms, despite the problems it faced defining and controlling
the money supply. This perception appears to have reinforced its sceptical stance towards the idea of CBI.
As in the 1970s, Thatcher continued to oppose CBI because she feared that elected politicians would lose control over interest
rates and ultimately inflation (see also Lawson 1992, pp. 830, 871). For Thatcher, maintaining low and stable inflation was
ultimately a political problem that could not be hived-off (Thatcher 1993, p. 707). Ministers had a crucial role to play in keeping
prices down through their agency, strategic calculation and shrewd decision-making. To give away control over policy would be
‘defeatist’ or an admission of failure: something that could undermine the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, parliamentary
accountability and, ultimately, the foundation of democratic legitimacy in Britain. Michael Scholar (personal interview 2016), Mrs
Thatcher’s private secretary (1981–83) and later a Deputy Secretary in the Treasury, confirmed that the Prime Minister saw interest
rates as a ‘lever of control’ over the economy and believed ‘it would be probably politically unwise to put that in the hands of […]
people who’d not been elected.’
Treasury officials were also apprehensive. Discussing the prospect of Bank independence against the backdrop of ministers’
success in getting inflation down to approximately three per cent by the mid-1980s, a Treasury paper argued:
… the lower inflation (especially in recent years) by a hands on approach to monetary policy, is
widely perceived as one of the government’s key achievements. It may not be easy to explain why
Ministers are content at this moment to hand over primary responsibility for controlling inflation
to the Bank of England, whose stock (in the monetary field at least) has not been particularly high
in recent years. Why should the government call into question its own future wisdom, or longevity
(HM Treasury 1988, p. 25)?
The paper went on to claim that CBI would involve, ‘ … giving up the flexibility and adaptability of the current arrangements, and
transferring elsewhere a considerable element of the Prime Minister’s and the Chancellor’s power base (authors’ emphasis)’ (Ibid.,
p. 28).
In trying to explain why Thatcher rejected CBI, it is worth clarifying what she (and the Treasury) meant when they feared Bank
independence would lead to a loss of government control. The Treasury paper makes clear that it sees the advent of CBI as
The Second Rejection: Lawson’s 1988 Proposal
involving a ‘considerable degree of co-operation and liaison’ with a newly independent Bank – or to put it differently, a sharing
of power (Ibid., p. 4). In particular, the paper discusses the need for more co-ordination between monetary and fiscal policy,
especially as the Bank would now have sole responsibility for the former (Ibid., pp. 17–18). A similar picture is sketched out for
exchange rate policy. Indeed, it is in this area where real limits to independence are identified. As we have seen,. Lawson’s
proposals for CBI granted the Bank greater autonomy to intervene in foreign exchange markets. However, evidence from this
period suggests a significant gap between these aspirations and policy practice. According to a note from David Perez (in charge
of monetary policy at the Treasury) to Lawson in January 1988, the BoE failed to participate in coordinated currency intervention
operations with other European central banks at this time because of Treasury delays in granting permission:
The Bank of England were told about the operation in advance [but] … did not join in … [because] they
judged that by the time they had got clearance from us [the Treasury] the moment would have passed.
So they did not bother to ask. (Perez 1998)
Such evidence leads us to question whether the Conservative Government would have easily given up control over exchange rate
policy at this time.
Moreover, some Treasury officials feared that a loss of control could put ministers in a position of having to accept responsibility
without power in the area of monetary policy. The Treasury’s 1988 paper (like Lawson’s proposals) accepts that an independent
Bank would have to be made accountable to parliament and briefly discusses how such an arrangement could be implemented.
However, there is an awareness in the Treasury paper (but not Lawson’s proposals) that Britain’s constitutional tradition may well
prevent ministers from escaping responsibility (and blame), especially if an independent Bank presided over controversial
decisions:
If the opposition put down a motion of no confidence in the BOMC … [Board of Monetary Control] … it is
hard to imagine the Chancellor – who would have cooperated extensively with the BOMC on exchange
rate policy and in devising monetary and fiscal targets – avoiding being drawn into debate and into
using the government’s majority in the House of Commons in support of the BOMC. So BOMC
accountability to Parliament inevitably involves some degree of government approval of the BOMC
(Ibid., p. 12).
These comments suggest that while Lawson may have hoped that Bank independence would depoliticise monetary policy (in
Burnham’s sense of the term) Britain’s centralised polity made it a challenge to place the political character of decision-making at
one remove (Diamond 2015).
Second, Thatcher and the Treasury continued to display reservations that the Bank in its current form was not competent enough to
implement monetary policy if it was made independent. In her memoirs, Thatcher (1993, p. 706) recalls that she, ��'doubted
whether we had people of the right calibre to run’ an independent BoE. When asked why Lawson’s 1988 proposal was rejected,
Terry Burns argues that ‘there was no evidence that the Bank of England would do the job any better’ and that handing monetary
policy ‘over to the Bank of England was not thought by the politicians to be a very strong statement’, adding that ‘Mrs Thatcher
was very much of this view’ (Burns personal interview 2016). The 1988 Treasury paper was critical of the Court of the Bank,
asserting that most members lacked any expertise in monetary policy (HM Treasury 1988, p. 9). It concluded that: ‘Everything will
depend on the people involved … No doubt new powers and status would in time attract people of the necessary calibre, but a
difficult transition period could lie ahead’ (Ibid., p. 27). Such ruminations hardly represented a ringing endorsement of the Bank’s
current personnel.
The Treasury also believed that if CBI was to operate effectively, the Bank would need to undergo institutional reform so that ‘ … 
the status of [its] decision-making would … be enhanced’ (Ibid., p. 7). To do so, the paper proposed extending the Governor and
governing board’s period of office, while also giving parliament a say in appointments to these positions. In giving more weight
to the Bank’s decision-making, the paper suggested creating a Board of Monetary Control (BOMC), along the lines of both the
Federal Open Market Committee and the Bundesbank Council. The BOMC would be staffed with officials who had an expert
knowledge of monetary policy and who would hold this position on a full time basis (Ibid., pp. 8–9). Without these institutional
reforms, the paper feared that the government would continue to try to influence (and would be seen to influence) the Bank,
therefore undermining the whole rationale for the change: ‘Since cooperation and liaison between the Bank and the Treasury
would continue to be essential, there would be considerable scope for nudges and winks, and perhaps the occasional arm-
twisting … ’ (Ibid., p. 7) if the authority of the Bank was not boosted.
In short, the failure of the Conservatives to grant BoE independence in the late 1980s highlights the significance of inter-
organisational distrust. In the Treasury, real concerns existed as to whether CBI could be made to work in an open economy which
had traditionally been so reliant on the exchange rate as an instrument for influencing outcomes. The 1988 Treasury paper is
littered with commentary questioning whether models of CBI elsewhere were applicable to Britain. It surmised that Bank
independence was likely to involve a more open and transparent discussion of the ends and means of monetary policy, a
prospect the Treasury deemed ‘dangerous’ in the short term, especially if the government and the Bank disagreed. The paper
goes on:
The experience of those countries which already enjoy a more open debate suggests that policy-
making is possible under these conditions, though there can be very bumpy periods. Given the
central importance of the exchange rate in the UK – and the extreme sensitivity of the exchange
markets to rumour and careless talk – a more open approach to monetary policy could prove a more
uncomfortable experience here than in Germany or the US, which has scarcely had, or needed to have,
an exchange rate policy for most of its history (original emphasis) (Ibid., pp. 26–27).
Such reflections help to explain why the Thatcher Government ultimately favoured ERM membership over CBI as a tool for
controlling inflation, although clearly this argument needs further development. The exchange rate would have been viewed as a
policy instrument that kept elected representatives at the centre of monetary affairs, something that proved to be the case but
not in the way those politicians intended.
So far, this article has argued that inter-organisational distrust helps explain the Thatcher Government’s rejection of CBI. Number
Ten (supported by analysis from the Treasury) had negative expectations about the Bank’s abilitycompetence to implement
monetary policy and saw no obvious reason for increasing its dependence on this institutionautonomy in this area. Interestingly,
the idea of using the ERM to control inflation may have become more attractive because (despite its Euro-scepticism) a broader
coalition within the parliamentary party believed membership of this institution would be more effective at fulfilling this function.
Indeed, it may have been thought ERM participation would actually extend the authority of politicians because this exchange rate
system was inter-governmental and involved an element of diplomacy. In this final section, we argue that inter-organisational
distrust between the Major Government and the BoE continued to thwart any prospects for CBI.
While Lawson put forward the idea of BoE independence and did not pursue it further, Norman Lamont advocated CBI based on
the New Zealand model in September 1991 and then again following sterling’s exit from the ERM, with papers submitted to
Major in November 1992 and January 1993 (Lamont 1999, pp. 322–6). Although he does not reproduce a copy of his scheme in
his autobiography, we can glean a reasonable sense of the details from contemporary Treasury papers. One Treasury’s publication
suggested the Bank be given operational independence to implement monetary policy, with reference to a broader framework of
guidelines and targets (HM Treasury 1993). It also advised that decisions be taken by a Monetary Policy Committee, as opposed
to the single Governor model, and considered whether this committee should be staffed at least partly by external figures from
the City, industry and academia. As with Lawson’s proposals, there was an acceptance that the Bank would need to be
accountable to Parliament. The paper offers no firm conclusions concerning how exchange rate policy might operate if CBI was
granted, but hints that the government would want to retain existing responsibility for formulating any strategy towards sterling
(Patel 2008, p. 33).
Our research confirms that inter-organisational distrust prevalent during the Thatcher era continued to shape the Major
government’s consideration of BoE independence. As in 1979 and 1988, Treasury officials were hostile to the policy, with Lamont
submitting the September 1991 proposal to Major without informing Terry Burns as Permanent Secretary ‘because I knew he
firmly opposed my views’ (Lamont 19929 [Q5], p. 324). More significantly, like Thatcher, Major perceived CBI as a loss of actual
control over monetary policy, not the appearance of it. As Lamont, who grew increasingly frustrated about interference by
Number Ten in his remit, notes in his memoirs:
Deep down the PM also believed it was the responsibility of politicians to run the economy. He
quite enjoyed the power involved in making interest rate decisions and thought it perfectly natural
that matters such as by-elections should be taken into account in the decision. (Lamont 1999,
p. 325)
Major himself states that, because of Britain’s constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility, it would be difficult to make
an independent Bank accountable to parliament – a view which, as noted above, was shared in the Treasury (House of Commons
1994, p. v, Major 1999, p. 153, 675). The broader question of Europe was also perceived to be an issue, with Major worried that
CBI would be seen by Euro-sceptics as a sign that sterling’s membership of the Single Currency was on the agenda.
Policy differences between senior Conservatives and the BoE over Black Wednesday fuelled tensions that may have fed into the
broader debate about Bank independence. Ken Clarke (2016, p. 304) (then Home Secretary) has asserted in his memoirs that he
felt bounced by Terry Burns (Treasury) and Robin Leigh Pemberton (Governor of the Bank of England, 1983–93) into agreeing
sterling’s exit from the ERM – a move he initially resisted in alliance with Douglas Hurd (Foreign Secretary) and Michael Heseltine
(President of the Board of Trade). Unsurprisingly, Lamont takes a different view of events, accusing his Cabinet colleagues of
delaying the inevitable while currency reserves were haemorrhaging at an alarming rate (Lamont 1999, p. 251, Clarke 2016,
p. 306). Quite what Major’s view of the Bank’s performance was during this crisis is unclear, but Sarah Hogg, his adviser, was
scathing in her assessment. She blames the run on sterling on Threadneedle Street’s lack of preparation (Clarke 2016, p. 304).
Bank of England Independence and the Major Government
Referring to the prospect of BoE independence, she wrote to Major to complain:
The idea that the government (which has taken the flak, including that which should have landed on
the Bank) should now implicitly state that the Bank is better at monetary policy than a minister
does stick in the gullet a bit. (quoted in Mance 2018, Seldon 1997, p. 317)
Furthermore, negative expectations about the competence of the BoE to implement monetary policy in the event of independence
seem to have been behind Clarke’s reluctance to promote such change after he became Chancellor, despite saying he was in
favour of the idea in principle. In practice, Clarke seems to have been ambivalent towards CBI. In his evidence to the Treasury
Select Committee investigation into the role of the Bank in economic policy, Clarke stated that he had no ‘hard or fast opinion’ on
the subject of independence (House of Commons 1993, p. vi). One reason for this equivocation may have been his scepticism
towards the Bank as an institution, and its capacity for implementing monetary policy. We have already noted Clarke’s
unhappiness at being bounced (as he saw it) into approving sterling’s suspension from the ERM on Black Wednesday by the Bank
and the Treasury. Budd asserts that Clarke had a ‘life-long horror of experts’, adding that ‘Ken Clarke believed he was better than
the Bank. It wasn’t just a political instinct; it was also economic’ (Budd personal interview 2016). When Gordon Brown unveiled
New Labour’s proposals to make the Bank independent in 1997, not only did Clarke oppose the move, but he added for good
measure that Threadneedle Street was ‘an institution with a track record showing that it has been wrong’ (House of Commons
1997).
Furthermore, our research suggests that contrary to the arguments of some academics (Burnham 1999, pp. 47–8, Cobham et al.
2008, Blancheton 2016) Clarke (and the Treasury more generally) did not perceive the reforms he made to the conduct of
monetary policy as a forerunner to independence. Burns stated that, ‘Kenneth Clarke didn’t really run with this idea’ (Bank
independence) and that Clarke ‘enjoyed the “Ken and Eddie Show”’ (Burns, personal interview 2016). Similarly, Alan Budd, who as
the Chief Economic Adviser spoke first on behalf of the Treasury at these monthly meetings, further commented that he did not
know if Clarke ‘ever changed his mind as a result …  ’ of the discussions that took place (Budd, personal interview 2016). At this
time, the BoE was certainly in favour of more independence, ‘ … and being able to put itself on the same footing as the Federal
Reserve and the Bundesbank’ (Anon 2, personal interview 2016). But Bank officials interviewed for this research remained
unconvinced that Clarke’s reforms represented a precursor to more radical action. Anon 1 (personal interview, 2016), an
anonymous high-ranking official at Threadneedle Street in the mid-1990s, recalled lobbying the Treasury on the issue: ‘Whenever
we wanted to raise the independence issues, these guys in the Treasury would say, “Come on, you’ve got your opportunity now.
You’ve got your forum. You don’t need independence now”’. This implies that Treasury officials saw the new framework as a
substitute for independence. The same official doubted whether Clarke’s reforms actually enhanced the authority of the Bank. For
example, the published minutes were thought to be ‘pretty anodyne actually’ and that they ‘did not properly reflect some of the
discussions we had’ as the minute-takers had ‘learnt to write fairly meaningless minutes’ (Anon 1, personal interview 2016). Some
Bank officials even saw disadvantages with the existing institutional position under Clarke. In 1996, a BoE paper was published
arguing that the increased transparency of central banking correlated with reduced autonomy (Briault et al. 1996).
This article has argued that inter-organisational distrust helps us explain why the Conservatives were not attracted to the idea of
CBI in the 1980s and 1990s. Ministers (supported by Treasury officials) possessed negative expectations concerning the BoE’s
ability to implement monetary policy and were unwilling to increase their dependence on that institution. As suggested in the
literature on trust, these inter-organisational relations were differentiated and complex. At times there were divisions between the
Prime Minister and the Chancellor (Thatcher – Lawson; Major – Lamont). Moreover, differences existed in the Treasury. Under
Lawson in particular, some officials were un-enthusiastic about the prospect of giving the Bank more autonomy, and this
scepticism may have helped to bolster Thatcher’s arguments. Finally, our research also supports Zand’s idea of ‘spiral
reinforcement’. It is possible to uncover evidence of Conservative (and Treasury) distrust towards the BoE as far back as the 1970s
(if not before). The experience of implementing monetary policy in the 1980s and 1990s entrenched the belief that ministers were
as competent as the Bank (if not more so) to keep inflation under control, and such perceptions undermined the case for CBI.
Do these conclusions have any relevance for contemporary debates about central banking, especially at a time when central
banks themselves have become increasingly powerful, yet controversial (Jones and Matthijs 2019)? In one sense, our case helps to
demonstrate how attitudes to CBI have changed since the 1990s, certainly within government. While the Thatcher and Major
Administrations may have had doubts about the competence of the BoE to implement monetary policy, these have long since
disappeared. Indeed, one peculiar tendency since 2010 is the way the BoE (and other central banks) have gained greater
discretion and power, despite widespread criticism of their performance during the global financial crisis. While the Bank’s
narrow focus on inflation targeting before 2007 has now been discredited, politicians have shown no inclination to reassert
ministerial responsibility over monetary policy. Instead, the BoE has been encouraged to adopt ‘unconventional’ monetary
measures, such as Quantitative Easing (QE), especially when an economic recovery failed to materialise after the credit crunch. It
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is also now accepted that when implementing monetary policy, the BoE needs to take into account not just price developments
but the emergence of credit and asset bubbles. Indeed, Threadneedle Street has reacquired sole responsibility for financial
regulation just so that it can discharge this dual mandate. These developments may lead us (along with Paul Tucker, former
member of the Monetary Policy Committee) to conjecture whether the British government has become ‘too casual’ (or trusting)
about delegating policy to arms-length bodies (Tucker 2018, pp. 320–1)?
Second, as central bankers have become more powerful, there is a feeling they are becoming more ‘political’. In one sense,
central banks have never been independent, an argument made by Hartwell (2019). They have always had to operate within the
confines of a political system and will inevitably be affected by the biases and pressures of that environment. However, the wider
mandate and greater discretion they have enjoyed since the global financial crisis has highlighted the fact that central banks are
making decisions that have re-distributional consequences. One example is the impact of Quantitative Easing (QE). Each time the
BoE injects liquidity into the financial system by purchasing certain types of assets, such actions can benefit some groups while
penalising others. In particular, it has been argued that the BoE’s preference for buying government gilts has inflated the price of
assets held by the wealthiest in society, whilst the low interest rates that have accompanied QE have punished small savers (Green
and Lavery, 2015). Historically, the case for placing the conduct of monetary policy at one remove from politicians was because
monetary policy was thought to be a technocratic exercise involving considerations of efficiency and not distribution.
Commentators have now started to challenge this assumption (see also Balls et al. 2016, King 2016, pp. 207–9).
Finally, these developments have prompted the question: can these increasingly powerful central banks be legitimised
(Fernandez-Albertos 2015)? While we have not emphasised such concerns in this article, our evidence shows the issue of
legitimacy played some role in the arguments deployed by Thatcher and Major to rebut the case for BoE independence. The idea
of CBI was resisted because it was thought to be incommensurate with the constitutional importance of accountability
(encapsulated in the doctrine of ministerial responsibility). One response to this dilemma has been to suggest that central banks
can be legitimised, so long as they are designed and governed in accordance with the values and principles underpinning
governance in liberal democracies in the twenty-first century (Tucker 2018). Others are more sceptical of such a project. Even if it
could be made to work, what evidence is there to show that the values and principles of liberal democracy can confer legitimacy
on non-majoritarian institutions like central banks (Koop and Reh 2019)? We live in a world where the idea of representative
democracy is in crisis, in part perhaps because our elected representatives themselves disavow responsibility for policy outcomes.
Yet the ‘technocratic’ arms-length bodies that replace our politicians only further stoke this feeling of anti-politics, therefore
undermining the conditions for their own existence. Resolving this conundrum is a particularly important challenge facing British
governments in a post-Brexit world.
Notes
1. For a statement of this position, see Nigel Lawson’s speech ‘The New Conservatism’ delivered to the Bow Group in 1980s and
reprinted in his memoirs (1992, pp. 1039–54).
2. Some Treasury officials (Wass 2008, p. 179)  contest this interpretation and argue that the crisis was the result of an
accident. However, it is not denied that, at the time, the Treasury desired devaluation and lobbied the BoE (which was
sceptical) to adopt such a policy.
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